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Navy Shipbuilding: Increasing Focus on Sustainment Early 
in the Acquisition Process Could Save Billions 
Why the GAO Did This Study 
The U.S. Navy requested over $40 billion each of the last three years to build, 
operate, and sustain its fleet. Acquisition decisions made as ships are developed and built 
can have a long-term effect on sustainment costs and ship quality. 
The GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DoD) 
considers and plans for sustainment when acquiring weapons. Among other objectives, this 
report assesses the extent to which 
1) Navy ship programs deliver ships to the fleet that can be sustained as 
planned; 
2) the Navy develops and uses effective sustainment requirements during 
acquisition;  
3) ship programs are effectively identifying and evaluating sustainment risks in 
planning documents; and  
4) leadership considers programs’ sustainment planning and outcomes. 
The GAO reviewed DoD and Navy acquisition policy and guidance, evaluated 
acquisition plans, collected sustainment metrics, and conducted interviews with more than 
100 organizations, including program office and fleet units. The GAO assessed 11 classes 
of shipbuilding programs (all nine that delivered warships during the last 10 years, as well as 
two newer classes of ships). 
What the GAO Found 
The Navy has delivered warships to its fleet over the past 10 years—such as aircraft 
carriers, destroyers, and submarines—that require more effort to sustain than initially 
planned. In assessing how these classes of ships are sustained, the GAO found 150 
examples of class-wide problems, such as unreliable ship systems. These problems 
stemmed from shipbuilding programs not identifying, evaluating, or mitigating sustainment 
risks during the acquisition process. The GAO found that it would cost the Navy $4.2 billion 
to correct just the 30% of these problems for which the Navy had data on estimated repair 
costs (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Problems Requiring More Sustainment Effort than Planned Across Multiple Ships in a Class 
The GAO found that shipbuilding programs’ requirements for sustainment reflect 
weaknesses with how DoD policy defines these requirements for ships. Sustainment 
requirements should influence acquisition decisions that determine the sustainability of a 
ship class, such as the ship’s design. However, the Navy’s sustainment requirements do not 
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provide key information on how reliable and maintainable mission-critical systems should be 
and therefore, cannot adequately inform acquisition decisions. 
The GAO also found that shipbuilding programs did not consistently address sustainment 
risks in acquisition planning documents. For example, the operating and support costs 
included in cost estimates did not capture all sustainment risks that could affect costs or 
evaluate sensitivity to changing sustainment assumptions, contrary to DoD and Navy cost 
estimating guidance. As a result, for six shipbuilding programs whose costs the GAO could 
assess, the Navy had underestimated sustainment costs by $130 billion, as shown in Figure 
2. 
 
Figure 2. Operating and Support Cost Estimate Growth for Six Ship Classes 
The Navy has begun making some changes to its acquisition oversight process, 
such as developing sustainment program baselines and adding a sustainment oversight 
review. While positive, these changes focus on considering sustainment after key decisions 
are made early in the acquisition process. The GAO also found that the DoD is not required 
to provide detailed information about shipbuilding programs’ sustainment cost growth to 
Congress. As such, Congress does not have full insight into the extent of shipbuilding 
programs’ cost growth and why such growth occurred 
What the GAO Recommends 
The GAO is making one matter for congressional consideration to enhance oversight 
and 11 recommendations to help the DoD and the Navy improve ship sustainment. 
The DoD concurred with eight and partially concurred with three recommendations 
but did not describe specific actions, which the GAO believes are necessary to improve 
sustainment outcomes. 
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